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The standard two-country model of international trade with monopolistic competition
predicts a more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world produc-
tion of a good and its share of world demand for that same good, a result known as the
‘home market eﬀect’. We ﬁrst show that this prediction does not generally carry through
to the multi-country case, as production patterns are crucially aﬀected by third country ef-
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11 Introduction
Since Krugman (1980), general equilibrium models of international trade with increasing returns
to scale and trade costs have been associated with what has come to be known as the ‘home
market eﬀect’ (henceforth, HME). This eﬀect is generally deﬁned as “a more-than-proportional
relationship between a country’s share of world production of a good and its share of world demand
for the same good” (Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008, p.2).1 As a result, “countries will tend to export
those kinds of products for which they have relatively large domestic demand” (Krugman, 1980,
p.955).
The basic HME model is traditionally considered to be the one proposed by Helpman and
Krugman (1985) in the wake of Krugman (1980). Their setup features two countries and two
sectors employing labor as their only input. One sector supplies a freely-traded homogeneous
good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, whereas the other sector produces
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good under increasing returns and monopolistic competition à la
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Preferences are Cobb-Douglas across the two goods and symmetric
CES across varieties of the diﬀerentiated good. For each variety of the diﬀerentiated good, ﬁxed
and marginal input requirements are constant and identical across countries. International trade
in that good is hampered by frictional trade costs of the ‘iceberg’ type, whereas the homogenous
good can be traded freely. The latter assumption leads to factor price equalization (henceforth,
FPE) across countries, i.e., labor earns the same wage everywhere. When taken together, FPE,
trade costs and a ﬁxed input requirement imply that the larger country supports, in equilibrium,
the production of a more than proportionate number of diﬀerentiated varieties. This makes the
larger country a net exporter of the diﬀerentiated good as, due to symmetry, output per variety
is identical across countries while demand is proportionate to country size.
The string of restrictive assumptions underlying the basic HME model is quite long. It con-
cerns: (i) preferences; (ii) market structure; (iii) the existence of a freely traded good; (iv) factor
price equalization; and (v) the focus on just two countries.2 Given the central role played by
the HME in new trade theory, a key issue has therefore become the extent to which this result
survives changes in those assumptions. The literature has thus far made progress on the ﬁrst four
issues.
Concerning preferences, Helpman (1990) speciﬁes the demand conditions under which the
1There is an alternative deﬁnition of the HME that captures the impact of country size on wages when these
are not equalized (Krugman, 1980). We discuss the issue of factor price equalization below. See also footnotes 4
and 6 for further details.
2The basic HME model considers ﬁnal goods only. However, it is homomorphic to a model in which the
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good is replaced by a homogenous one and this is produced by assembling the varieties of a
horizontally diﬀerentiated intermediate. See Ethier (1982).
2HME materializes: the cross-elasticity between varieties of the diﬀerentiated good must exceed
the overall price-elasticity of demand for the diﬀerentiated good as a whole. Replacing the upper-
tier Cobb-Douglas preferences with a CES function, Yu (2005) ﬁnds that the value of the elasticity
of substitution across the homogeneous and the diﬀerentiated goods matters for the existence of
the HME. Head et al. (2002) show that, when goods are diﬀerentiated according to their place
of production (as in Armington, 1969) rather than according to the ﬁrms producing them (as
in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), the HME may also vanish. Finally, Ottaviano and van Ypersele
(2005) show that CES preferences, leading to ﬁxed markups over marginal cost, are not needed
to generate a HME.
As for market structure, Feenstra et al. (2001) as well as Head et al. (2002) show that
monopolistic competition per se is not crucial in that the HME can arise even in homogenous-
good sectors with restricted entry and Cournot competition. All that matters is the presence of
positive price-cost margins and trade costs.
The role of the freely traded homogeneous good produced by the perfectly competitive sector,
the so-called ‘outside good’, has also been analyzed in detail. Its existence leads to FPE as long
as the good is produced in both countries. The outside good also allows for international special-
ization as it absorbs the trade imbalances arising in the Dixit-Stiglitz sector. Extending previous
insights by Davis (1998), Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) introduce Armington diﬀerentiation and
‘iceberg’ trade costs in the homogenous good sector, thus preventing FPE from holding in gen-
eral.3 Their set-up generates the results in Davis (1998) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) as
special cases when, respectively, there is no Armington diﬀerentiation and there is neither Arm-
ington diﬀerentiation nor trade costs for the outside good. Through numerical analysis they show
that the HME survives, with the qualiﬁcation that it is stronger for countries whose demands
deviate more signiﬁcantly from the average. Accordingly, “the outside good assumption, although
clearly at odds with reality, does not aﬀect qualitatively the results concerning international spe-
cialization and the direction of trade [so that] its pervasive use is justiﬁable on the ground of
algebraic convenience” (Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008, p.21).
The survival of the HME in a multi-country set-up is, instead, still a much neglected issue.
This is surprising both because of its importance for empirical analysis (see, e.g., Davis and
Weinstein, 1999 and 2003; Head and Mayer, 2004; Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008) and because of
the early doubts on its theoretical robustness (Krugman, 1993). Our aim is to ﬁll this important
gap in the theoretical and empirical exploration of the predictions of international trade models
with monopolistic competition. In so doing, we start by showing that the HME prediction does
not generally carry through to the multi-country case, as production patterns are crucially aﬀected
3See Picard and Zeng (2005) for an analysis of the issue when utility is quasi-linear quadratic and the homoge-
nous good incurs linear trade costs.
3by third country eﬀects. Then we derive an alternative prediction that holds whatever the number
of countries considered. This prediction takes also into account other important features of the
real world such as the cross-country variations in Ricardian comparative and absolute advantages
leading to the violation of FPE. In particular, we show that the model predicts the existence of a
more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world demand and its share of
world production only after the impacts of third country eﬀects and comparative advantage are
controlled for, which can be achieved through a simple linear ﬁlter.
Two modelling choices make our results analytically neat. First, we maintain the assumption
of a freely traded outside good. As argued by Crozet and Trionfetti (2008), this is not likely to
substantively aﬀect our results. Second, following Deardorﬀ (1984) and Treﬂer (1995), we allow
for the violation of FPE by introducing Ricardian diﬀerences in technology that generate inter-
national wage diﬀerences that are invariant to international sectoral specialization.4
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 extends the model by
Helpman and Krugman (1985) to a set-up with an arbitrary number of countries and Ricardian
diﬀerences in technology. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the extended model. Section
4 ﬁrst shows that the HME is not a general property of the equilibrium. Then it explains how
a more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world demand and its share
of world production always emerges after controlling for third country eﬀects and technological
diﬀerences. Section 5 concludes.
2 An extended Helpman-Krugman model
The world economy consists of M countries indexed i =1 ,2,...,M.C o u n t r yi hosts an exoge-
nously given mass of Li > 0 consumers, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically.
Hence, both the world population and the world labor endowment are given by L =
P
i Li. Labor
is the only factor of production, is assumed to be internationally immobile and its services are
traded in perfectly competitive national labor markets.
Preferences are deﬁned over a homogenous outside good (H) and over a continuum of varieties
of a horizontally diﬀerentiated good (D). The preferences of a typical resident of country i are
4When there is no freely traded outside good, factor prices react to changes in specialization, which requires
analyzing the so-called ‘wage equations’. These are transcendental and cannot be solved analytically (see, e.g.,
Fujita et al., 1999, p.55). Hanson and Xiang (2004) have recently used the wage equations in a two-country setting
to derive theoretical predictions about the HME when there is a continuum of industries that diﬀer with respect
t ot h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation and trade costs. Unfortunately, the analyses of Laussel and Paul (2007)
and Crozet and Trionfetti (2008), again in the two-country case, suggest that general analytical results cannot be
derived for an arbitrary number of countries.





i , 0 <μ<1. (1)














where dji(ω) is the consumption in country i of variety ω produced in country j,a n dΩj is the set
of varieties produced in country j with j =1 ,2,...,M.T h ep a r a m e t e rσ>1 measures both the
constant own-price elasticity of demand for any variety, and the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties.
The production of any variety of the diﬀerentiated good takes place under increasing returns
to scale by a set of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. This set is endogenously determined in
equilibrium by free entry and exit. In what follows, we denote by ni the mass of ﬁrms located in
country i.
Production of each variety requires a ﬁxed and a constant marginal labor requirements, fi > 0
and ci > 0 respectively, which may be country-speciﬁc. The ratio fi/ci measures the intensity of
increasing returns to scale. These are assumed to be sector-speciﬁc as they depend on the state
of technology and are common across countries. Increasing returns to scale and costless product
diﬀerentiation yield a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrms and varieties, so we will use the two
terms interchangeably. As to trade barriers, international shipments of any variety are subject to
‘iceberg’ trade costs: τji ≥ 1 units have to be shipped from country j to country i for one unit
to reach its destination.
Given our assumptions, in equilibrium ﬁrms in each sector diﬀer only by the country they are
located in. Accordingly, to simplify notation, we drop the variety label ω from now on. Then,
the maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the following demand in country









where pij is the delivered price of the variety, Ej is aggregate expenditure in country j,a n dPj is










Because of the iceberg assumption, a typical ﬁrm established in country i has to produce xij =
dijτij units to satisfy ﬁnal demand dij in country j.T h e ﬁrm takes (2) into account when














μEj − wifi, (4)
where wi i st h ew a g ei nc o u n t r yi.P r o ﬁt maximization with respect to pij,t a k i n gPj as given





D u et of r e ee n t r ya n de x i t ,p r o ﬁts must be non-positive in equilibrium. Then (4) and (5)







In other words, total ﬁrm production inclusive of the amount of output lost in transit must
be large enough for operating proﬁts to cover the ﬁxed costs of production. The fact that the
ratio fi/ci determines the equilibrium scale of production justiﬁes its choice as a measure of the
intensity of increasing returns to scale.
Let φij ≡ τ
1−σ
ij be a measure of trade freeness, valued one when trade is free and limiting zero
when trade is prohibitively costly. Replacing (2) as well as (3) into (6), multiplying both sides by









with equality if ni > 0,f o ri =1 ,2,...,M.
Turning to the homogenous good H, this is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms under
constant returns to scale with zi denoting the corresponding unit labor requirement in country
i.T h e r a t i o zi/ci measures the relative productivity (comparative advantage) of country i in
the diﬀerentiated sector. Good H c a nb et r a d e df r e e l ya c r o s sc o u n t r i e sa n dw ec h o o s ei ta s
numéraire. Hence, its price must be equalized to one across markets: pH
i =1 . Marginal cost
pricing then implies pH
i = ziwi.T h e r e f o r e , wi =1 /zi must hold in all countries, provided that
some numéraire production takes place everywhere. We henceforth assume this to be the case.5
This provides us with a simple way to account for international factor price diﬀerences driven by
Ricardian variations in labor productivity (see Treﬂer, 1993 and 1995, for supportive evidence).
Accordingly, compared with another country j,c o u n t r yi is said to exhibit an ‘absolute advantage’
in the diﬀerentiated good sector whenever zi <z j.
5See Appendix A for the formal conditions.
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where r ≡ fi/ci measures the intensity of increasing returns to scale, which is assumed to be the
same across countries, and ai ≡ zi/ci measures the relative productivity of country i in sector
D. Accordingly, compared with another country j,c o u n t r yi is said to exhibit a ‘comparative
advantage’ in the diﬀerentiated good sector whenever ai >a j.
Conditions (8) deﬁne a system of M conditions in M unknown ni with exogenously given
country characteristics, namely, sizes Li, trade freeness measures φij, Ricardian coeﬃcients ai
and zi. Intuitively, consider the point of view of a ﬁrm based in country i.T h e r a t i o Lj/zj
represents the expenditures in country j where our ﬁrm competes with the all other ﬁrms based
in the various countries k. Expenditures in the target country are ‘discounted’ twice. First, they
are discounted by φij in order to account for the export costs from i to j.S e c o n d ,t h e ya r ea l s o
discounted by 1/
P
k nk(ak)σ−1φkj, which is a transformation of the price index in country j deﬁned
in (3). This second discounting factor captures the fact that the intensity of competition faced by
our ﬁrm in country j increases with the number of competitors (nk) and their productivity (ak)
while it decreases with the trade costs they incur to serve country j. The proﬁts our ﬁrm makes
on its sales to j are proportionate to Lj/zj after such a double discounting. By repeating this
calculation for all target markets j =1 ,...,M, we are able to compute the overall operating proﬁts
of our ﬁrm. Then, conditions (8) tell us that, due to free entry and exit, the distribution of ﬁrms
across countries adjusts so that in equilibrium operating proﬁts do not exceed the ﬁxed costs. In
other words, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms across countries is such that no opportunity
of proﬁtable entry remains unexploited. Accordingly, conditions (8) state that in equilibrium
exogenous cross-country diﬀerential advantages in terms of proximity to customers are exactly
oﬀset by endogenous diﬀerential disadvantages in terms of proximity to competitors: countries
with better access to markets and a comparative advantage in the diﬀerentiated good host larger
numbers of ﬁrms.6
To make the notation more compact, it is useful to turn to matrix form. In particular, we
deﬁne the matrices of bilateral trade freeness Φ, relative productivity in the diﬀerentiated good
6In the absence of the freely traded outside good, better access to markets and a comparative advantage in the
diﬀerentiated good would be also oﬀset by higher wages per eﬃciency unit of labor. In this case, however, the
linear representation of the equilibrium, on which all our ensuing results are based, would break down. See the
discussion in footnote 4.
7sector A and absolute productivity in the homogeneous good sector B respectively as
Φ ≡
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
1 φ12 ··· φ1M
φ21 1 ··· φ2M
. . .
. . . ... . . .
φM1 φM2 ··· 1
⎞





















In equilibrium B is also the matrix of wages. Henceforth, we impose that trade is free within
countries (φii ≡ 1) and that trade ﬂows between any given pair of countries are subject to the
same frictions in both directions (φij = φji). Although these assumptions on the freeness of
trade are not strictly necessary for deriving our theoretical results, they simplify the analysis.
Furthermore, we deﬁne the vector of labor endowments l ≡ (L1 L2 ...L M) and the vector of the
numbers of ﬁrms n ≡ (n1 n2 ...n M).
Then, letting 1 stand for the M-dimensional vector whose components are all equal to one,






−1Bl ≤ 1, (9)
The terms in (9) mirror those in (8). The ﬁrst ‘numerator’ term Aσ stresses the role of each coun-
try’s marginal costs in the determination of its ﬁrms’ prices. The second ‘numerator’ term ΦBl
highlights the role of distance-weighted expenditures that can be served from each country.7 The
‘denominator’ term diag(ΦAσ−1n) captures the role of distance-and-productivity weighted supply
that can serve each national market, which is a measure of the intensity of local competition.
Let us call n∗ =( n∗
1 n∗
2 ... n ∗
M) the vector satisfying conditions (9). This vector always exists
and is unique for all admissible parameter values.8 While for speciﬁc parameter values the vector
may entail some n∗
i’s equal to zero, in the literature the HME has been deﬁned with reference to
equilibria in which n∗
i’s are strictly positive. For this reason in what follows we focus on interior
equilibria in which n∗
i > 0 for all countries i =1 ,2,...,M and condition (8) holds as an equality
for all countries.









7This measure is our counterpart to Davis and Weinstein’s (2003) IDIODEM index. This index is a heuristic
measure of the ‘idiosyncratic demand’ ﬁrms face in a certain country that takes into account not only local demand
but also demand originating from neighboring countries. By analogy with Krugman’s two-country case, Davis and
Weinstein interpret a larger than one estimate of the elasticity of a country’s output to the IDIODEM index as
evidence of the presence of the HME. In Appendix C we argue that the problem with this interpretation is that
the analogy is not valid when there are more than two countries. See Behrens et al. (2004) for further details.
8See Appendix B.1 for a proof.













where ϕi is the i-th component of the vector Φ−11, which can be interpreted as an inverse measure
of country i’s average centrality in the network of our M trading countries.9
A necessary condition for the existence of an interior solution can then be obtained by trans-


































where the inequality results from 0 <φ ij < 1 a n dw eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnitions of r and ai.
Accordingly, an interior equilibrium cannot arise when country i is suﬃciently large (large Li),
has suﬃciently strong comparative advantage (large ai/aj), has suﬃciently low ﬁxed costs (small
fi), or is suﬃciently centrally located (small ϕi). An interior equilibrium cannot arise either when
product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently strong and the diﬀerentiated good absorbs a large share of
expenditures (small σ/μ).
Assuming that an interior equilibrium obtains, the corresponding cross-country distribution


































where F=diag(f1 f2 ...f M) is the diagonal matrix of ﬁxed input requirements. In (14), θ and λ
∗
respectively denote the vector of countries’ shares of world demand (as measured by aggregate
expenditures) and the vector of countries’ shares of world production (as measured by either
aggregate ﬁxed costs payments or, equivalently due to free entry, aggregate operating proﬁts) in
the diﬀerentiated good sector.10
The equilibrium condition (13) reveals that the relation between λ
∗ and θ is linear at any
interior solution.11 This relation is parametrized by a matrix that depends itself on the trade
9Behrens et al. (2004) provide suﬃcient conditions for the freeness of trade matrix Φ to be invertible. See also
Behrens et al. (2007) for additional interpretations of ϕ in terms of centrality measures.
10See Appendix B.2 for a proof.
11The labor share of the numéraire sector is computed as a residual. Of course, since wages are equalized in
eﬃciency units, that share is strictly positive for all countries (see Appendix A for more details).
9freeness matrix Φ and the relative productivity matrix A. For equal shares of demand, countries
with a relative advantage in terms of better centrality and higher productivity in the diﬀerentiated
good sector attract larger shares of production in that sector.
4 Market size and specialization
As discussed in the introduction, the HME has been deﬁned as a more-than-proportional rela-
tionship between a country’s share of world production of a good and its share of world demand
for the same good. Formally, the diﬀerentiated good sector exhibits a HME in country i at the
expenditure distribution θ if and only if













j/θj if and only if θi >θ j. For the HME to be a general prediction of the model,
(15) must hold for all countries i =1 ,...,M. Hence, we may deﬁne the HME as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Home Market Eﬀect) Assume, without loss of generality, that country labels

















Stated diﬀerently, there exists a HME whenever there is no ‘industrial leap-frogging’, in the
sense that smaller countries always host a relatively smaller share of the diﬀerentiated good sector.
This implies that the ordering in terms of sector shares reﬂects the ‘natural’ ordering in terms of
countries’ economic sizes.12
It is readily veriﬁed that condition (16) does not generally hold in the extended model. To
see this, consider two simple counterexamples with M =3countries. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ea r e
no Ricardian diﬀerences across countries that are evenly spaced at distance φ on a line segment
































12Appendix C presents an alternative deﬁnition that has been used in empirical analyses of the HME (see, e.g.,
Davis and Weinstein, 2003). This deﬁnition is equivalent to the one adopted in the main text only in the case of
two countries. Anyway, even when deﬁned according to such an alternative deﬁnition, the HME is not a general
property of the extended model.










thus violating again (16). Hence, although the expenditure share in the central country 2 is
smaller than that in the peripheral country 1,c o u n t r y2 attracts a more than proportionate share
of ﬁrms (‘hub eﬀect’).
Consider next a situation in which there are no cross-country diﬀerences in centrality because
countries are evenly spaced around a circle with radius
√
φ and shipping between any two locations








































thus violating (16). Hence, although its demand share is the smallest, country 3 attracts a more
than proportionate production share thanks to its higher relative productivity in the diﬀerentiated
good sector (‘comparative advantage eﬀect’). The fact that Ricardian diﬀerences interact with
market size to aﬀect the equilibrium location of industry is not surprising but it is important to
keep that in mind in applied work as Ricardian diﬀerences are the rule rather than the exception
in the real world.
These examples prove that the HME does not generally arise in the extended model because
in (13) countries’ equilibrium production shares λ
∗ are aﬀected not only by their demand shares
θ but also by relative centrality and comparative advantage in the diﬀerentiated good sector.
We now show: (i) how to deﬁne an alternative production measure whose country shares always
magnify the cross-country variation in demand shares θ; (ii) how to recover such measure from
the actual production shares λ
∗.
The key issue is to ﬁnd a way to separate the impact of relative centrality and comparative
advantage on the one side from the impact of relative demand driven by relative size (i.e. relative
labor endowments) and relative wages (i.e. absolute advantage) on the other side. Consider ﬁrst
the production shares that would prevail without comparative advantage (ai = a for all i’s) and
without centrality advantage (φij = φ for all i 6= j,w h e r eφ is the average bilateral freeness of
trade). In this case, size and absolute advantage alone determine the cross-country variation of










for i =1 ,...,M. In (19) the label SA is a mnemonic for “size and absolute advantage”. It is
readily veriﬁed that (16) holds with λ
∗ replaced by λ
SA. Hence, the extended model predicts a
HME when countries are evenly spaced and in the absence of comparative advantage.
11Now remove, instead, absolute advantage (zi = z for all i’s) so that θi =1 /M for all i =
1,...,M. In this case centrality and comparative advantage alone determine the cross-country














where CC is a mnemonic for “centrality and comparative advantage”. Note that (20) does not
generally satisfy (16).
Interestingly, (13), (19) and (20) allow us to linearly decompose λ




CC,w i t hW ≡ [diag(Φ−1A−σ1)ΦAσ]






1+( M − 1)φ
¤
∈ (0,1).





∗ − (1 − β)λ
CC¤
. (21)
By construction, (16) holds with λ
∗ replaced by λ
SA.H e n c e ,w eh a v ea general prediction of the
extended model: a more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world demand
and its share of world production only obtains after the inﬂuence of centrality and comparative
advantage on the latter is ﬁltered out through (21).
The working of the linear ﬁlter in (21) can be clariﬁed by its application to the two counterex-
amples discussed above. Consider the ﬁrst counterexample, described by (17), with no compara-

























Turning to the second counterexample, described by (18), in which there are no cross-country
diﬀerences in centrality because all countries are evenly spaced around a circle and all trade ﬂows

























5C o n c l u s i o n
In the two-country case the standard model of international trade with monopolistic competition
predicts a more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world production of a
good and its share of world demand for the same good, a result known as the ‘home market eﬀect’.
We have shown that this prediction does not generally carry through to the empirically relevant
case in which there are several trading countries diﬀering in terms of centrality and technology.
We have then derived a new prediction of the model that does hold for any number of trading
12countries and any pattern of technological diﬀerences. In particular, we have shown that the
model predicts a more-than-proportional relationship between a country’s share of world demand
and its share of world production only after the inﬂuence of centrality and comparative advantage
on the latter has been controlled for through a simple linear ﬁl t e r .A st h i sp r e d i c t i o na l s ot a k e s
into account technology-driven diﬀerences in factor prices across countries, it may prove useful
f o rb e t t e ri d e n t i f y i n gh o m em a r k e te ﬀects empirically. We keep this for future work.
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Appendix A: Incomplete Specialization
Some numéraire production takes place everywhere only if any M − 1 dimensional subset of
countries is unable to satisfy world demand (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003). This is the case
if the total mass of workers in each country is greater than the total labor requirement in the
15diﬀerentiated good sector: Li >n i i for all i,w h e r e i is the amount of labor employed by a
representative sector D ﬁrm in country i.I ti sr e a d i l yv e r i ﬁed that
n
∗




















so that, in equilibrium, some numéraire production takes place everywhere if:
Li >n
∗
iσfi i =1 ,...,M
where n∗
i is given by (12). As can be seen from (12), the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms is proportional
to μ for all countries i. Thus, the expenditure share μ must be small enough for the numéraire
good to be produced everywhere. Alternatively, the expenditure share 1 − μ on the numéraire
good must be large enough.
Appendix B: Equilibrium Properties
B.1. Existence and Uniqueness Since each component of the left hand side vector in (9) is
a continuous function of n,P r o p o s i t i o n1 in Ginsburgh et al. (1985) shows that an equilibrium
always exists.
Now assume that ﬁr m sr e l o c a t ei nr e s p o n s et op r o ﬁtd i ﬀerentials, so that ni increases (resp.
decreases) if Πi (n) > 0 (resp. < 0) where we have made the dependence of the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
(4) on n explicit. The dynamics of the relocation process is given by
·
ni = ξiΠi (n), (B.1)
where
·
ni ≡ dni/dt and where ξi > 0 stands for the speed of the adjustment in country i.D e n o t e














































thus implying that J is negative deﬁnite.
16Finally, let ∆ stand for the unit simplex of Rn. According to Rosen (1965, Theorem 8), if J
is negative deﬁnite for every λ ∈ ∆, the system (B.1) is globally stable on ∆.
Because existence and global stability of an equilibrium implies uniqueness, the extended
model always admits one and only one equilibrium.
B.2. Interior Equilibrium To derive the expression for an interior equilibrium, note that






































where we have used the commutativity property of the diagonal matrix product and used the fact
that the freeness of trade matrix Φ is invertible (see Behrens et al., 2004, for suﬃcient conditions).
Hence, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms is given by (12).






Using (B.2), (12) implies (13).
Appendix C: The ‘home market shadow’
Davis and Weinstein (2003) adopt a deﬁnition of the HME in terms of ‘comparative statics’ that is
diﬀerent from the one in terms of ‘rankings’ we use in the main text. Speciﬁcally, they deﬁne the
HME as “a more than one-for-one movement of production in response to idiosyncratic demand”
(Davis and Weinstein, 2003, p.7). Whereas the two deﬁnitions are equivalent in the case of two
countries (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, p.2582), they are not necessarily so in a multi-country
setup. Nonetheless, we show here that in such setup also the ‘comparative statics’ HME is not
generally predicted by the extended Helpman-Krugman model.
Formally, assume that country i hosts a sector share at period t that is proportionate to its




i. Assume that in period t+1,a l lθj’s have














=0 , so that the new equilibrium production




i . In the presence of a HME, the disproportionate positive






















































This result suggests, quite naturally, the following deﬁnition for the HME:
Deﬁnition 2 A monopolistically competitive sector exhibits a HME in country i at the demand








where dθ is a small variation satisfying dθi > 0 and
P
jdθj =0 .
Unfortunately condition (C.1) need not hold at the equilibrium (13). In particular, we have:
Proposition 1 Assume that trade costs are not pairwise symmetric. Then, there exists a pertur-
bation dθ,w i t hdθi > 0 and
P
j dθj =0 , such that the disproportionate causation from demand
to supply does not hold.
Proof. Because λ∗
i > 0, θi > 0,a n ddθi > 0, a necessary condition for (C.1) to hold requires
dλ∗













(gij − gii)dθj (C.2)
where the gij’s are the coeﬃcients implied by (13), and where the last equality stems from the
constraint that the perturbations sum up to zero. When trade costs are not pairwise symmetric,
we can always ﬁnd perturbations dθj such that (C.2) is negative, in which case (C.1) does not
hold for all perturbations satisfying dθi > 0 and
P
j dθj =0 .I ti ss u ﬃcient to note that in the
general asymmetric case minj{gij} < maxj{gij} a n dt h a ta tl e a s to n edθj, j 6= i,m u s tb es t r i c t l y
negative.
Proposition 1 shows that (C.1) need not hold for some variations dθ unless trade costs are pairwise
symmetric across all countries (i.e., φij = φ, ∀i 6= j). Hence, the disproportionate causation from
demand to supply does not generally hold.
For example, as demand shares change between two periods, a ‘HME shadow’ may arise, in
the sense that, even though the demand share of country i increases, its production share may
increase less than proportionately if also the demand share of another country j increases. In
some cases, this eﬀect may be so strong that country i simply loses some of the diﬀerentiated
sector, despite the increase in its demand share. As in the case of the deﬁnition in terms of
‘rankings’, the reason is that the appeal of a country as a production site depends not only on the
relative size of its domestic market, but also on its relative proximity to all other foreign markets
as well as on technology and factor price diﬀerences.
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